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The process of European integration is characterized by a fundamental 
asymmetry which Joseph Weiler (1981) accurately described as a dualism 
between supranational European law and intergovernmental European policy 
making. Weiler is also right in criticizing political scientists for having too 
long focused only on aspects of intergovernmental negotiations while ignoring 
(or, at least, not taking seriously enough) the establishment, by judge-made 
law, of a European legal order that takes precedence over national law (Weiler 
1994). This omission is all the more critical since it also kept us from recog- 
nizing the politically highly significant parallel between Weiler’s dualism and 
the more familiar contrast between “negative” and “positive integration” 
(Tinbergen 1965; Rehbinder/Stewart 1984) - i.e. between measures increasing 
market integration by eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions 
of competition, on the one hand, and common European policies to shape the 
conditions under which markets operate, on the other hand.
The main beneficiary of supranational European law has been negative inte­
gration. Its basic rules were already contained in the “primary law” of the 
Treaties of Rome. From this foundation, liberalization could be extended, 
without much political attention, through interventions of the European 
Commission against infringements of Treaty obligations, and through the de­
cisions and preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice. By contrast, 
positive integration depends upon the agreement of national governments in 
the Council of Ministers; it is thus subject to all of the impediments facing Eu­
ropean intergovernmental policy making. This fundamental institutional dif­
ference is sufficient to explain the frequently deplored asymmetry between 
negative and positive integration in EC policy making (Kapteyn 1991; Merkel 
1993). The most likely result is a competency gap, in which national policy is 
severely restrained in its problem-solving capacity, while European policy is 
constrained by the lack of intergovernmental agreement. To the extent that this 
is true, the political economy of capitalist democracies, which had developed 





























































































II. Negative Integration: The Loss of Boundary Control
In the history of capitalism, the decades following the Second World War 
were unusual in the degree to which the boundaries of the territorial state had 
become coextensive with the boundaries of markets for capital, services, goods 
and labor1. These boundaries were by no means impermeable, but transactions 
across them were nevertheless under the effective control of national govern­
ments. As a consequence, capital owners were generally restricted to invest­
ment opportunities within the national economy, and firms were mainly chal­
lenged by domestic competitors. International trade grew slowly, and since 
governments controlled imports and exchange rates, international competitive­
ness was not much of a problem. While these conditions lasted, government 
interest rate policy controlled the rate of return on financial investments. If 
interest rates were lowered, job-creating real investments would become rela­
tively more attractive, and vice versa. Thus, Keynesian macro-economic man­
agement could smooth the business cycle and prevent demand-deficient unem­
ployment, while union wage policy, where it could be employed for macro- 
economic purposes, was able to control the rate of inflation. At the same time, 
government regulation and union collective-bargaining controlled the condi­
tions of production. But since all effective competitors could be, and were, 
required to produce under the same regimes, the costs of regulation could be 
passed on to consumers. Hence the rate of return on investment was not neces­
sarily affected by high levels of regulation and union power2; capitalist accu­
mulation was as feasible in the union-dominated Swedish welfare state as it was 
in the American free enterprise system.
1 The pre-World War I period and the 1920s were both times of open capital markets, free 
world trade, and a tendency toward capitalist crisis (Polanyi 1957). In the early 1930s, 
the major industrial nations responded to the Great Depression with protectionist or even 
autarkist strategies of competitive devaluation, capital export controls, import restrictions, 
and subsidized exports. As a result, the world economy collapsed. After the Second 
World War, it took more than two decades of GATT negotiations to gradually re­
liberalize international trade, and it took two oil price shocks before the world capital 
markets were again freed from national control. In retrospect, this gradual transition from 
closed national economies to an uncontrolled world economy appears to have provided 
the optimal conditions for “social-democratic” solutions at the national level. Until the 
mid-1970s, at any rate. Western European societies were able to profit from the economic 
dynamism of capitalism while stabilizing its fluctuations through Keynesian macro- 
economic controls, and correcting its distributive inequities through union power and 
social-welfare policies (Ruggie 1982; 1995).
2 In the neo-marxist political-economy literature, much is made of declining shares of profit 
in the postwar decades as an indicator of the unresolvable contradiction between the 
capitalist economy and the democratic state. But since investment would cease when the 
rate of return on capital becomes negative, governments and unions would become aware 
of the risks of a profit squeeze for employment and growth - and economies with neo- 
corporatist institutional structures are in theory, and were in fact, quite capable of 




























































































During this period, therefore, the industrial nations of Western Europe had 
the chance to develop specifically national versions of the capitalist welfare 
state - and their choices were in fact remarkably different (Esping-Andersen 
1990). In spite of the considerable differences between the “Social-Demo­
cratic”, “Corporatist” or “Liberal” versions of the welfare state, however, all 
were remarkably successful in maintaining and promoting a vigorous capitalist 
economy, while also controlling, in different ways and to different degrees, 
the destructive tendencies of unfettered capitalism in the interest of specific 
social, cultural, and/or ecological values (Scharpf 1991a; Merkel 1993). It was 
not fully realized at the time, however, how much the success of market-cor­
recting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial state to 
control its economic boundaries. Once this capacity was lost, through the 
globalization of capital markets and the transnational integration of markets 
for goods and services, the “golden years” of the capitalist welfare state came 
to an end.
Now the minimal rate of return that investors can expect is determined by 
global financial markets, rather than by national monetary policy, and real 
interest rates are generally about twice as high as they used to be in the 1960s. 
So if a government should now try to reduce interest rates below the interna­
tional level, the result would no longer be an increase of job-creating real 
investment in the national economy, but an outflow of capital, devaluation, and 
a rising rate of inflations. Similarly, once the territorial state has lost, or given 
up, the capacity to control the boundaries of markets for goods and services, it 
can no longer make sure that all competing suppliers will be subject to the 
same regulatory regime. Thus, if now the costs of regulation or of collective- 
bargaining are increased nationally, they can no longer be passed on to con­
sumers. Instead, imports will increase, exports decrease, profits will fall, 
investment decline, and firms will go bankrupt or move production to more 
benign locations3 4.
Thus, when boundary control declines, the capacity of the state and the 
unions to shape the conditions under which capitalist economies must operate
3 Conversely, national monetary policy does have the power to attract capital, by setting 
national interest rates above the international level. But in doing so, it will raise the 
exchange rate, which decreases the international competitiveness of the national 
economy.
4 In theory, they could still be passed on to consumers through a devaluation of the 
national currency. However, regulations and wage setdements tend to affect specific 
branches of industry, rather than the economy as a whole. The loss of competitiveness 
may thus not be general enough to be fully compensated (from the point of view of the 
affected industry) by adjustments of the exchange rate. Moreover, under the conditions of 
global currency speculation, export competitiveness is no longer the most important 
factor determining exchange rates. In addition, an independent central bank whose 
primary goal is price stability, is perfectly capable of stabilizing the exchange rate at a 





























































































is also diminished. Instead, countries are forced into a competition for loca­
tional advantage which has all the characteristics of a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (Sinn 1994). The paradigmatic example of this form of “regulatory 
competition” was provided, during the first third of this century, by the in­
ability of “progressive” states in the U.S. to regulate the employment of chil­
dren in industry. Under the “negative commerce clause” decisions of the 
Supreme Court, they were not allowed to prohibit or tax the import of goods 
produced by child labor in neigboring states. Hence locational competition in 
the integrated American market prevented all states from enacting regulations 
that would affect only enterprises within their own state (Graebner 1977). In 
the same way, the increasing transnational integration of capital and product 
markets, and especially the completion of the European internal market, re­
duces the freedom of national governments and unions to raise the regulatory 
and wage costs of national firms above the level prevailing in competing loca­
tions. Moreover, and if nothing else changes, the “competition of regulatory 
systems” that is generally welcomed by neoliberal economists (Streit/Mussler 
1995) and politicians, may well turn into a downward spiral of competitive 
deregulation in which all competing countries will find themselves reduced to 
a level of protection that is in fact lower than preferred by any of them.
If nothing else changes - but what might change is, again, illustrated by the 
child-labor example. In the United States it was ultimately possible - after the 
“constitutional revolution” of 1937 - to solve the problem through legislation 
at the federal level. Similarly, in Europe there is a hope, at least among unions 
and the political parties close to them, that what is lost in national regulatory 
capacity might be regained through social regulation at the European level. 
Against these hopes, however, stands the institutional asymmetry of negative 
and positive integration, which was mentioned in the introduction.
In the abstract, the desirability of negative integration, or liberalization, is 
not seriously challenged in the member states of the Union. The basic com­
mitment to create a “Common Market” was certainly shared by the govern­
ments that were parties to the Treaties and by the national parliaments that 
ratified these agreements. It found its legal expression in the “primary law” of 
Treaty provisions requiring the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade and the establishment of a system of undistorted competition. What may 
not have been clearly envisaged in the very beginning were the doctrines of 
the direct effect and supremacy of European law that were early on established 
through decisions of the European Court of Justice. Why national governments 
should have acquiesced in these decisions has become an interesting test case 
for competing approaches to integration theory5- In the present context, how­
5 Garrett (1992; 1995) interprets the case law of the European Court of Justice in an 
“intergovemmentalist” frame as the focal point of a latent consensus among governments, 
whereas Burley and Mattli (1993) point to the existence of serious conflicts of interest. In 




























































































ever, the explanation is less interesting than the effect of their acquiescence. 
Once the direct effect and supremacy of European law was accepted, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice had the opportunity to continuously 
expand the scope of negative integration without involving the Council of 
Ministers6. At the same time, under the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, 
measures of positive integration could be blocked in the Council by the veto of 
a single member government.
The political-economic significance of this institutional asymmetry becomes 
clear when it is compared to the situation under national constitutions. Even in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, where neoliberal theory has gained the 
greatest influence on the constitutional discourse, the neoliberal concept of a 
“social market economy” does not imply the singleminded perfection of a 
competitive order, but has been defined, by its original promotor, as the 
combination of the “principle of market freedom with that of social compen­
sation” (Muller-Arnack 1956: 243). Moreover, the German Constitutional 
Court has consistently refused to grant constitutional status to any economic 
doctrine, neoliberal or otherwise, insisting instead on the “neutrality of the 
Basic Law in matters of economic policy”. Thus, economic freedom is pro­
tected against state intervention only within the general framework of human 
and civil rights, and the goals of competition policy have no higher constitu­
tional status than all other legitimate ends of public policy. Accordingly, 
market-creating and market-correcting measures are equally legitimate in 
principle, and - witness the uneven history of cartel legislation and practice - 
both have to cope with the same difficulties of finding political support, in a 
highly pluralistic political system. This is also true in other member states of 
the European Community where, generally speaking, public policy is even less 
constrained by doctrines of the “economic constitution” type.
It does not follow from the text of the Treaties of Rome or from their gene­
sis that the Community was meant to abolish this constitutional parity between
legal system and its effectiveness as a “mask and shield” against direct political 
intervention. See also Weiler (1993; 1994) and Mattli/ Slaughter (1995). What Garrett 
seems to ignore, within his own frame of reference, is the importance of institutional 
decision rules: The Court (and the Commission, for that matter) is effectively able to 
impose outcomes that would not find a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers - but 
which cannot be corrected by the Council as long as the opposing governments are not 
themselves able to mobilize a qualified counter-majority (or, when the Court’s decision 
involves an interpretation of the Treaty, unanimous action) in the Council.
6 Negative integration was and is pursued hy the Commission primarily through 
“decisions” and “directives” under Arts. 89 and 90 of the Treaty and through action 
against national infringements of Treaty obligations under Art. 169. Of at least the same 
practical importance is the direct application of European law in ordinary legal disputes 
before national courts and the possibility, under Art. 177, of preliminary rulings of the 
Court of Justice at the request of any (even inferior) national court Again, the Council of 
Ministers is not involved, and national governments will typically appear before the Court 




























































































the protection of economic freedom and market-correcting intervention 
(VerLoren van Themaat 1987; Joerges 1991; 1994a; v.d. Groeben 1992). Nev­
ertheless, through the supremacy of European law, the four economic 
freedoms and the injunctions against distortions of competition have in fact 
gained constitutional force vis-à-vis the member states (Mestmacker 1994: 
270) while the corresponding options for social and economic intervention 
(which at the national level would have competed on an equal footing) are im­
peded by the high level of intergovernmental consensus required for positive 
integration at the European level7.
HI. Positive Integration: The Limits of Intergovernmentalism
While negative integration was advanced, as it were, behind the back of 
political processes by the Commission and the Court, measures of positive 
integration require explicit political legitimation. As long as the Luxembourg 
Compromise was still applied, indirect democratic legitimacy could be derived 
from the necessary agreement of all national governments in the Council of 
Ministers. The price of unanimity was, of course, an extremely cumbersome 
decision process. The Single European Act of 1986 was supposed to change 
this by returning, for harmonizatipn decisions “which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market” (Art. 100A), to the rule 
of qualified-majority voting in the Council. As a consequence, the decision 
process has in fact been accelerated, since it is now no longer necessary to 
bargain for every last vote (Dehousse/Weiler 1990). However, voting 
strengths and voting rules in the Council are adjusted in such a way that 
groups of countries united by common interests can rarely be outvoted. In any 
case, the veto remains available as a last resort even to individual countries, 
and the unanimity rule still continues to apply to a wide range of Council 
decisons. Thus, the need for consensus remains very high for measures of 
positive integration.
Nevertheless, the Community is actively harmonizing national regulations in 
such areas as health and industrial safety, environmental risks, and consumer
7 According to neoliberal theorists, the Community was meant to do no more than to 
establish and safeguard the postulates of economic freedom and undistorted competition 
in the European market. Hence the expansion of the European mandate, brought about by 
the Maastricht Treaty, in the fields of environmental protection, industrial policy or social 
cohesion, is viewed most critically by authors of this school (Mestmacker 1992; Behrens 
1994). In order to minimize potential damage, it is now also postulated that “the rights of 
individuals, granted by the Treaty of the European Communities, to participate in 
commerce across national borders [must] not be encroached upon by measures in the 
service of the newly established competencies” (Mestmacker 1994: 286). If this were 





























































































protection (Joerges 1994b; Majone 1993), and it had in fact begun to do so 
long before the Single European Act (Rehbinder/Stewart 1984). It is also 
reported that these regulations are indeed defining high levels of protection in 
many areas (Eichener 1993; Voelzkow 1993; Héritier et al. 1994). How can 
these findings be reconciled with my claim that positive integration is impeded 
by the high consensus requirements in the Council of Ministers?
In order to resolve this apparent puzzle, it is necessary to examine the 
underlying constellation of interests among governments represented in the 
Council of Ministers8. Unanimity or qualified majority voting rules institu­
tionalize veto positions - and it is analytically true that - ceteris paribus - the 
existence of multiple veto positions reduces the capacity for political action 
(Tsebelis 1995). But whether this will in fact result in blockages depends on 
the actual constellations of interests among the participants. If these are har­
monious (“pure coordination games”) or at least partly overlapping (“mixed- 
motive games”), unanimous agreement is possible in principle, and effective 
solutions can be reached in spite of high consensus requirements. Blockages 
are only to be expected in constellations of conflicting interests - and even 
then, agreement may be achieved if the losers can be compensated through side 
payments or package deals (Scharpf 1992b). Thus, if positive integration in 
Europe should run into insurmountable barriers, the likely explanation will be 
conflicts of interests among member states that are too intense to be settled 
within the institutional framework of the European Union.
Such conflicts do in fact exist, but they are not everywhere, and there is no 
reason to think that they are always virulent in areas that substantively and 
procedurally would be defined as positive integration. In order to show this, I 
will concentrate on the regulative policies of the Community (thus neglecting 
the fields of foreign policy and security policy, justice and home affairs, 
common agricultural policy, technology and industrial policy or the social 
funds). Disregarding for the moment ideological differences, one may gen­
erally assume that rationally self-interested national governments will consider 
three criteria in evaluating proposed regulations at the European level: (1) the 
extent to which the mode of regulation agrees with, or departs from, estab­
lished administrative routines in their own country; (2) the likely impact on
8 I will limit myself here to the simplest form of “intergovernmental” explanation. It is of 
course true, as has been pointed out by several critics, that actual interaction patterns are 
much more complex. In addition to national governments (or the ministries represented in 
specialized Councils) they include at least the “supranational” Commission and 
“subnational" interest organizations and firms as players in connected games. I also do 
not rule out the possibility that, in order to explain specific decisions, two-level games 
and perhaps much more complex models must in fact be employed. Pragmatically, 
however, it still makes sense to first exhaust the explanatory power of simple, and hence 
transparent, models - and to add further complications only when necessary. And at any 
rate, the agreement of the national governments in the Council of Ministers has remained 




























































































the competitiveness of national industries and on employment in the national 
economy, and - where these are politically activated - (3) specific demands and 
apprehensions of their national electorates.
The exceptional importance of the expected costs of administrative and pro­
cedural adjustment in countries that are commited to active regulation, has 
been identified in studies by Adrienne Héritier and her collaborators (Héritier 
et al. 1994). It explains conflicts even between countries that have a common 
interest in high levels of regulatory protection. However, if agreement is 
reached at all, it is unlikely to reduce existing levels of protection9. In the 
following analysis, I will therefore concentrate on conflicts over economic and 
political interests10.
There, the boundary separating consensual and conflict-prone constellations 
can be roughly equated with the conventional distinction between product- 
related and process-related regulations (Rehbinder/Stewart 1984, 10). In the 
case of product-related regulations, the continuation of different national 
quality and safety requirements would perpetuate the very fragmentation of 
European markets which the Treaties of Rome and the Single European Act 
were designed to overcome. Since all countries agreed to the creation of the 
single market, it can also be assumed that the common economic interest in 
unified European standards outweighs divergent interests. Thus,while coun­
tries might differ in their substantive and procedural preferences, agreement 
on common standards is in the end likely to be reached. That is not true for 
process-related environmental and safety regulations11, and it is even less true 
for social regulations of the processes of production (Leibfried/Pierson 1992;
9 Héritier interprets these conflicts as a “regulatory competition”, where certain “high- 
regulation countries” attempt to influence the mode of European regulations in order to 
reduce their own adjustment costs. In the present context it is useful to point out that this 
is not the (Prisoner’s-Dilemma-like) "competition among regulatory systems” whose 
most likely outcome is competitive deregulation. In the processes studied by Héritier, all 
member states would prefer agreement on European regulations at high levels of 
environental protection, but they differ about the style of regulation that the Community 
should adopt Thus, their competition resembles the “Batde of the Sexes” game discussed 
below.
10 More differentiated analyses are possible, and may be indispensable in the study of 
specific cases. In the area of environmental policy, for instance, governments of 
economically highly developed and ecologically highly impacted countries must respond 
to the cross pressures of employment interests in the industrial sector and of 
environmentally sensitized voters. In less developed countries, by contrast, employment 
interests may be reinforced by the resistance of consumers to price increases caused by 
stringent environmental regulations. In either case, of course, government responses 
should also depend on the relative importance of the affected industries in the country in 
question.
11 Streeck (1993: 10) is correct in pointing out that process-related environmental and safety 
regulations may create obstacles to trade in the market for machine tools and production 
plants. For that reason, he includes these in his definition of “market making”, as 




























































































Lange 1992). Since they increase the cost of production, national regulation is 
rendered increasingly difficult under the dictates of international competition. 
So it is here that “social-democratic” aspirations for re-regulation at the Euro­
pean level would seem to be most pertinent. But it is also here that economic 
conflicts of interest among member states must be most acute. In order to jus­
tify this proposition, a somewhat more precise analysis of interest constella­
tions seems useful.
In the case of product-related regulations, the interest constellation is shaped 
by the institutional framework: Under Art. 30 of the Treaty, “quantitative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect” are prohib­
ited between member states. Under Art. 36, however, such measures are nev­
ertheless allowed if they are “justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals 
or plants..”. In other words, if national regulations should in fact serve one of 
the purposes specified in Art. 36, the default outcome in the absence of a 
common European regime would result in the continuation of fragmented 
European markets. Assuming that this is a prospect which all countries will 
want to avoid, they will still differ with regard to the aspiration level of com­
mon European regulations. Rich countries will generally prefer higher levels 
of consumer and environmental protection than poor countries would like to 
impose on their own consumers. Thus, the resulting constellation of interests is 
likely to resemble the “Battle of the Sexes” game (Figure 1) - a game in which 
negotiated agreement is generally difficult, but not impossible to achieve12.
Moreover, even when European regulations have been harmonized, Art. 
100A (4) gives countries with a preference for high levels of protection with a 
chance to introduce national regulations applying even more stringent stan­
dards. This changes the default outcome in favor of high-regulation countries 
and increases their bargaining power in negotiations about the common stan­
dard. Thus it is indeed plausible that, by and large, the harmonization of 
product-related regulations should in fact have achieved the “high level of 
protection” envisaged for “health, safety, environmental protection and con­
sumer protection” in Art. 100A (3) (Eichener 1993).
For process-oriented regulations, however, the institutional framework and 
the interest constellations are very different. Such regulations do not affect the 
useablity, the safety or quality of products so produced. Steel from furnaces 
with high sulphur dioxide emissions is indistinguishable from steel produced 
with the most expensive emission controls - and the same is true for automo­
biles produced by workers with or without paid sick leave in firms with or
12 Moreover, product-related standardization profits from procedural innovations which 
minimize the need for consensus in the Council of Ministers by restricting its decisions to 
the definition of safety principles - whose detailed specification is then left to 
“corporatist” committees representing the affected industries and national standardization 


































































































Figure 1: Preference for high or low European-wide standards in product-related regulations. 









without codetermination. As a consequence, there is no way in which Art. 36, 
or any of the other escape clauses contained in the Treaties, could justify 
excluding, or taxing, or in other ways discriminating against, products pro­
duced under conditions differing from those prevailing in the importing state.
Just as in the American child-labor example, the obvious implication is that 
in the absence of common European regulation, all member states would find 
themselves in a Prisoner’s-Dilemma constellation, in which all would be 
tempted to reduce process-related regulations, and to cut back on the welfare 
state, in order to improve their competitive position. By itself, of course, that 
would facilitate, rather than impede, the adoption of common European stan­
dards. The Prisoner’s Dilemma looses its pernicious character if binding 
agreements are possible, and since this is assured in the European Community, 
European re-regulation at the level desired by member states should be 
entirely possible. Yet it is here that the difficulties begin.
There are, first, the differences among national styles of regulation that 
Adrienne Héritier (1993; 1994) discovered in the field of air quality regula­
tions. As was suggested above, this would constitute a Battle-of-the-Sexes game 
superimposed on the Prisoner’s Dilemma13 which, by itself, would not rule 
out agreement. Greater difficulties arise from manifest ideological differences. 
Some governments may not share “social democratic” or “green” preferences 
for high levels of regulation, and may actually welcome external competitive 
pressures to achieve deregulation which they could not otherwise push through 
at home. But since these difficulties may change from one election to the next, 
they will not be further investigated here. What is unlikely to change from one
13 Heckathom and Maser (1987) have labelled this constellation, in which a “cooperative” 
solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma requires agreement on one several options that differ 




























































































election to another are conflicts of interest arising from different levels of 
economic development14.
After its Southern expansion, the European Community now includes mem­
ber states with some of the most efficient economies in the world alongside 
others that have barely risen above the level of threshold economies. This 
contrast manifests itself in large differences in (average)15 factor productivity. 
Thus, if the economically less developed countries are to remain competitive 
in the European internal market, their factor costs - in particular their wage 
costs, non-wage labor costs, and environmental costs - have to be correspond­
ingly lower as well. And in fact, industrial labor costs in Portugal and Greece 
are, respectively, one sixth and one fourth of those in Germany16, and differ­
ences in the levels of social-security systems (Sieber 1993; Ganslandt 1993) 
and in environmental costs (Frohlich 1992) are of the same magnitude.
Now, if these costs were raised to the level of the most productive countries, 
by harmonizing social-welfare and environmental regulations, the interna­
tional competitiveness of the economies with lower productivity would be de­
stroyed. If exchange rates were allowed to fall accordingly, the result would 
be higher domestic prices and hence, impoverished consumers. If exchange 
rates were maintained (e.g. in a monetary union), the result would be deindus­
trialization and massive job losses - just as they occurred in Eastern Germany 
when the relatively backward GDR economy was subjected to the full range of 
West German regulations under a single currency. The more enterprises are 
subject to international price competition17, the less democratically account­
able politicians in the economically less developed countries could agree to 
cost-increasing harmonization initiatives18. And this is even more true since - 
in contrast to the relation between East and West Germany - the rich EC 
countries would certainly not be willing (or even able) to compensate the vic­
tims of the industrial catastrophe through massive transfer payments.
14 In their discussion of environmental policy, Rehbinder and Stewart (1984: 9) focus 
instead on the distinction between “polluter states” and “environmental states”. This 
appears to be less useful as an explanation of voting behavior in Brussels, since highly 
developed countries produce more pollution and also have an interest in more stringent, 
European-wide, environmental regulations.
15 Naturally, Portugal and Greece (just like eastern Germany - Hank 1994) also have 
islands of above-average productivity, especially in new plants of multinational 
corporations.
16 According to surveys conducted by the Swedish employers’ association (SAF), overall 
costs of a man-hour in industry ranged in 1993 between 33 Swedish krona in Portugal, 
56 krona in Greece, and 204 krona in Germany (Kosonen 1994).
17 Of course, the intensity of price competition varies between sectors. For example, in 
agriculture, "Southern products” hardly compete with “Northern products”.
18 Thus, it is not only the opposition of enterprises that stands in the way of a European 
social policy (Streeck 1993). Governments in economically weaker state: must, on their 




























































































Nor would agreement be easier if the costs of social or environmental regu­
lations were not imposed on enterprises, but financed through higher income 
or consumption taxes. As long as average incomes in the poorest EC country 
amount to less than one fifth of average incomes in the rich countries, the less- 
developed EC countries must defend themselves against the European harmo­
nization of environmental and welfare regulations at levels of protection which 
may perhaps reflect the aspirations and the willingness to pay of citizens in the 
rich member states, but which are beyond the means of economically less 
developed countries. And unlike East Germany in the process of German uni­
fication, these countries are fully aware of their own best interests, and the 
constitution of the European Union provides them with an effective veto. The 
resulting interest constellation is represented as a game matrix in Figure 2.
Rich Countries
High Low
(1) 3 (2) 2
High
Poor 1 3 NA
Countries (4) 2 (3) 1
Low
3 NA 2
Figure 2: Preference for high and low European-wide standards in process-related regulations. 
In case of non-agreement (NA), no common standard is adopted.
As an illustration, take the case of air pollution control applied to industrial 
emissions. Highly industrialized and highly polluted rich countries are likely to 
have a clear preference for European-wide standards at high levels of protec­
tion (cell 1), which would also protect their own industries against “ecological 
dumping”, and they would least like to have have common (and binding) stan­
dards at low levels of protection (cell 3). For the poor countries, by contrast, 
high standards (cell 1) would amount to the destruction of less-productive 
branches of industry. But even common rules imposing uniformly low stan­
dards (cell 3) would be unattractive, since the less-productive, indigenous 
enterprises would then be exposed to the sharper competition of deregulated 
competitors from countries with high productivity. So, for them, the best out­
come would be non-agreement (cells 2 and 4) which would also be the second- 
best outcome for the rich countries. As a consequence, the status quo is likely 
to continue19.
19 If the affected branches of industry do not play a major role in the less developed member 
states, the damage done by European regulations at a high level of protection may be 

































































































Rich Countries Rich Countries
*L
*H
Product-Related Standards Production-Related Standards
Figure 3: Negotiated agreement on high (H) and low (L) European standards as compared to 
non-agreement (NA) in the case of product-related and process-related standards.
The differences between negotiations over product and process-related regu­
lations may become even clearer if the options are represented in the form of 
two-dimensional negotiation diagrams in which the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions represent utilities associated with particular outcomes for rich and 
poor countries, respectively (Figure 3). Points H and L represent the location 
of binding agreements on high standards and low standards, respectively. 
However, since the origin (NA) is chosen to represent the best outcome that 
each country could achieve if no agreement on European standards is reached 
(so that national standards will continue to apply) the negotiation space is 
effectively limited to the “Northeastern” quadrant above and to the right of the 
origin.
In the case of product-related regulations, rich countries would prefer 
agreement on high standards (H), while poor countries would prefer agree­
ment on low standards (L). But both groups of countries would prefer either 
solution to the outcome associated with non-agreement (NA). Hence both solu­
tions are located within the negotiation space, and agreement on one of them, 
or on a compromise rule located between H and L, ought to be possible in 
principle. Of course, under the unanimity rule, bargaining over relative ad­
vantage might still drag on, and under unfavorable conditions, negotiations 
might even fail. Thus it appears completely rational that governments, in the 
Single European Act, finally agreed to move toward qualified-majority voting 
specifically for the harmonization of product-related regulations (Art. 100A). 
It permits them to avoid deadlocks and speed up negotiations in constellations 
where they generally prefer agreement to disagreement.
The situation is different in the case of process-related regulations. Here 
there is no solution in the upper-right-hand quadrant that would be preferred
funds. It is also sometimes suggested that the agreement of some member states to 
relatively demanding environmental regulations may be a reflection on relatively less 




























































































to the status quo by both, rich and poor countries. From the point of view of 
the poor countries, even the adoption of common European standards at a low 
level of protection would be worse than the status quo. The rich countries, on 
the other hand, would prefer to improve their situation by introducing Euro­
pean-wide high-level standards, but this solution could not be imposed against 
the resistance of poor countries20.
To summarize, positive integration at the European level has achieved 
remarkable progress in the harmonization of product-related regulations, but 
the harmonization of process-related environmental and welfare regulations is 
proving much more difficult, while negative integration is effectively restrict­
ing national capacities for dealing with the problems generated by the integra­
tion of markets for capital, goods and services. If that state of affairs is con­
sidered unsatisfactory, one may logically seek for solutions in two directions - 
either by increasing the capacity for problem-solving at the European level, or 
by protecting national capacities for effective action even under the conditions 
of transnationally integrated markets.
IV. Solutions I: Increasing European Problem Solving Capacity?
In the face of pervasive conflict of interest, problem solving on the Euro­
pean level might be facilitated either through institutional reforms that would 
increase the capacity for conflict resolution, or through the search for sub­
stantive or procedural strategies that are able to reduce conflict to more man­
ageable levels.
1. M ajoritarian Solutions?
Obviously, the capacity for conflict resolution would be most directly 
strengthened if the Union would continue the move toward majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers that began with the Single European Act, and gained 
more ground in the Maastricht Treaty. If decisions generally could be reached 
by simple majority, the high-productivity countries could, at least for the time 
being and provided that they are able to agree among themselves, impose high 
standards on the rest of the Community. But, of course, constitutional changes 
in the European Union continue to depend on unanimous agreement, and the 
fact that the Northern enlargement of the Union nearly foundered on the vot­
ing issue shows that the presumptive losers are unlikely to agree to a regime in
20 Even though the Maastricht Treaty did generally allow for qualified-majority voting on 
environmental measures (Art. 130S), any five of the six countries with the lowest wage 
and non-wage labor costs in the Union (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Britain and 





























































































which they might be consistently outvoted. In this regard, the “joint decision 
trap” (Scharpf 1988) is still in good repair.
Moreover, if it were possible to move further toward majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers, the debate about the “democratic deficit” in the Euro­
pean Union would resume with a vengeance. As long as the democratic legiti­
macy of European governance must rest primarily on the agreement of demo­
cratically accountable national governments, the citizens of countries whose 
governments are outvoted have no reason to consider such decisions as having 
democratic legitimation21 2. In fact, even the cautious expansions of qualified- 
majority voting in the Single Act and in the Maastricht Treaty have triggered 
judicial responses and public debates in the member states which are so critical 
of the legitimacy of majority decisions in the Council that any further progress 
will need to be based on more solid foundations of legitimation (v.d. Groeben 
1992; Weidenfeld 1995)22.
Many of the critics still assume that the most appropriate solution was 
defined by the Spinelli draft constitution which would have transformed the 
European Community into a federal state with a bicameral legislature, consist­
ing of the directly elected European Parliament as the first chamber with full 
legislative and budgetary powers, and the Council as a second chamber repre­
senting member-state interests in the fashion of the German Bundesrat. The 
Commission would then take the place of a European government, elected by 
and accountable to the European Parliament (Williams 1991; Featherstone 
1994). What stands in the way is, of course, the institutional egotism of mem­
ber-state governments that are unwilling to relinquish their own control over 
European policy making. But that is not all. Proposals of this type also rest on 
weak foundations in democratic theory.
Democratic legitimacy is, after all, not merely a question of the formal 
competencies of a parliament. Representation and majority rule will assure 
legitimacy only in the context of (a) the preexisting collective identity of a 
body politic which may justify the imposition of sacrifices on some members
21 The theoretical background of this proposition can only be suggested here (Scharpf 
1970). A need for legitimation arises when decisions override the preferences of some 
affected parties. Until recently, the European Community was able to rely primarily upon 
an “output-oriented" form of legitimacy, for which the maximization of common welfare 
and the fair allocation of costs and benefits are crucial criteria. But as European 
interventions have become more frequent, more important, and their allocative effects 
more visible, “input-oriented” legitimacy (involving democratic discourse and the 
democratic accountability of decision makers) have gained in salience.
22 This is not meant to deny the possibility of non-majoritarian forms of legitimation 
(Majone 1994a; 1994b; Dehousse 1995). But the respect for expertise, impartiality and 
procedural fairness which may legitimate the decisions of courts, central banks, or 
American-style independent regulatory commissions, is unlikely to do much for the 




























































































of the community in the interest of the whole; (b) the possibility23 of public 
discourse over which sarifices are in fact to be imposed for which purposes 
and on whom; and (c) the political accountability of leaders who are visible to 
the public and are able to exercise effective power.
In the history of democratic governance, these preconditions have so far not 
yet been satisfied anywhere above the level of the nation-state (Calhoun 1993; 
Dahl 1994). They are not now satisfied in the European Union, and it is cer­
tainly not clear that they could be created in the foreseeable future (Grimm 
1992; Kielmansegg 1992; Scharpf 1992a, 1993). As of now, in any case, the 
political-cultural identity of the European Union is still very weak 
(Wilson/Smith 1993); the lack of a common language is a major obstacle to the 
emergence of a European-wide public discourse (Gerhards 1993); and as a 
consequence, we have no European-wide media, no European-wide political 
parties, and no political leaders with European-wide visibility and account­
ability. These conditions are not easily changed by constitutional reforms24, 
and as long as they prevail, majority votes in the European Parliament will not 
do much for the acceptance of decisions in countries or groups whose interests 
are being sacrificed.
For the time being, at any rate, it is then unlikely that institutional reforms 
could greatly increase the capacity for conflict resolution on the European 
level. Thus Weiler’s (1981) diagnosis, cited at the beginning of this paper, will 
continue to hold; In contrast to the legal processes defining and enforcing the 
supra-national law of negative integration, the political processes required for 
positive integration will retain their intergovernmental character and are eas­
ily blocked when national interests diverge. If that is so, however, it seems 
worthwhile to also explore the possibility that conflict-minimizing European
23 It is often argued that the European Community should not be held to ideal, but 
unrealistic standards of democratic practice which are frequently violated in all member 
states. In my view, this misses the point. Under modem conditions, democracy can only 
be defined as a potential or, as it were, a fleet-in-being. It is neither possible nor 
necessary that every matter be dealt with in the full light of public attention, as long as 
office holders must reckon with the possibility that any case may become politicized. 
When that is assured, the “law of anticipated reactions” must do the rest.
24 In my view, further increases in the legislative competence of the European Parliament 
are not the most promising short-term strategy, since they would also render European 
decision processes even more cumbersome than they are now. Instead, if the President of 
the Commission were elected by, and fully accountable to, the European Parliament, this 
would help to focus media attention on a highly visible position of political leadership; it 
would require parties in the EP to present candidates with a European-wide appeal; and it 
might, in due course, lead to the formation of European-wide political parties 
(Weidenfeld 1994). As Dehousse (1995) points out, however, the introduction of party- 
political orientations in the Commission might render its relations to national governments 
in the Council more difficult than they are now - an argument that finds ample support in 




























































































strategies might nevertheless be able to deal effectively with problems that can 
no longer be handled at the national level.
2. Conflict-avoiding Solutions?
There is in fact a whole range of such strategies (Scharpf 1994). One has 
already been mentioned above. In the harmonization of product-related stan­
dards, agreement is facilitated by restricting Council involvement to the for­
mulation of “principles”, and by leaving details to be worked out in corporatist 
standardization bodies. Moreover, in process-related environmental regula­
tions, Art. 130T now generally allows any member state to maintain or intro­
duce more stringent protective measures, provided that they “must be compat­
ible with this Treaty” (i.e. with negative integration). Thus, one way to over­
come the blockage described above would be to agree on minimum levels of 
protection that are just barely acceptable to the poor member states, while the 
economically more advanced countries remain free to maintain the higher 
standards which they consider necessary. But how could this be consid­
ered an effective solution? For countries that had very low standards to begin 
with, it is true, the common standard might well require substantial improve­
ments. But high-standard countries would still find themselves in the Pris- 
oner’s-Dilemma-like “competition among regulatory systems” that had pre­
vented the American states during the first third of this century from adopting 
child-labor regulations.
For this problem, a partial solution was provided by the Commission’s 
switch from German-Type emissions standards to the air-quality standards 
favored by the British government (Héritier et al. 1994). Since, on the whole 
(but in metropolies like Athens), air pollution is more of a problem in the 
highly industrialized regions of the Community, the seemingly uniform stan­
dard will generally require the economically more advanced countries to adopt 
more stringent anti-pollution measures than are needed in the less developed 
countries. Thus, the differential impact of air-quality regulation will not only 
facilitate the agreement of poor countries to higher standards, but it will also 
protect high-regulation countries against the temptations of competitive 
deregulation.
But, of course, the lucky accident by which the intensity of the pollution 
problem varies directly with the ability and willingness of countries to pay for 
solutions, cannot always be relied upon. It would not have worked, for in­
stance, in the paradigmatic case of child-labor regulations. Nevertheless, there 
may be a generally useful lesson to be learned from air-quality regulations: It 
is not necessarily true that European harmonization, in order to be useful, 




























































































3. Regulation at Two Levels?
More specifically, I am suggesting that the obstacles to agreement on 
process-related regulations might be considerably reduced by a variant of the 
idea of a “Europe with variable geometry” which, as far as I know, is not 
being considered in present discussions of institutional reform of the Com­
munity25. This suggestion is based on the assumption that the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game that European countries are forced to play against each other, 
in the presence of negative integration and in the absence of European-wide 
harmonization, is not played with equal intensity among all member states. 
The competition among regulatory systems is likely to be most acute between 
countries that are in direct economic competition because they produce the 
same type of goods at similar levels of productivity and of production costs. 
By contrast, countries producing at very different levels of productivity and 
production costs are generally not directly competing against each other in the 
same markets. If this is true, the failure of adopting a single European-wide 
standard would imply that at least two separate Prisoner’s Dilemma games are 
being played, one among the economically most efficient countries that are 
able to compete on productivity, and the other one among the less efficient 
economies that must compete on factor costs.
On this analysis, the solution seems obvious: In order to stop the pressure 
toward competitive deregulation26, there is clearly a need for the harmoniza­
tion of process-related regulations at the European level - but there is no need 
for a single, uniform standard. Instead, what would be needed is an explicit 
agreement on two standards offering different levels of protection at different 
levels of cost. The rich countries could then commit themselves to the high- 
standard regulations that are in keeping with their own levels of environmental 
and social aspirations, while the less developed countries could establish com­
mon standards at a lower level that would still protect them against the dangers 
of ruinous competition among themselves. In the course of their economic 
development, the lower standard could of course be raised, step by step, and 
brought into line with the higher one.
25 Overviews of earlier discussions and actual practices are provided by Nicoll (1984) and 
Langeheine and Weinstock (1984). There have also been proposals for a “Europe of 
relativities” which would generally define common European standards in terms of 
criteria that are sensitive to differences in the level of economic development. For 
example, the revenue to be raised by an EC-wide environmental tax might be defined as a 
percentage of gdp in order to avoid disproportional burdens on the less developed 
member states (v. Weizsàcker 1989). Similar models are also being discussed in 
reference to social policy.
26 Remarkably, negative integration in the European Community includes elaborate 
injunctions against distortions of competition created by subsidies, preferential public 
procurement and other forms of “affirmative action” favoring national producers - but 




























































































Compared to the difficulties of reaching agreement between rich and poor 
countries on European-wide uniform standards, negotiations on double stan­
dards should be much easier (Figure 4). Moreover, in contrast to other pro­
posals for a two-speed Europe, the club of high-regulation countries would 
have no interest at all in excluding applicants who think that their country is 
able to conform to the more demanding standards. The most difficult choice 
would have to be faced by countries “in the middle”, like Britain or Italy, who 








Figure. 4: Process-Related Regulations with the Option of a Double Standard. NA = Outcome 
in the Case of Non-Agreement
4 2 2
1 3 NA 3 NA
2 1 2
3 NA 2 3 NA
2 2 3
3 NA 3 NA 4
4. But What if Institutions Matter?
So far we have looked only at the negotiations between rich and poor coun­
tries, and we have assumed that within each of these groups agreement should 
be relatively unproblematic - provided that national differences in the styles of 
regulation are not of very high salience. But what has been said applies fully 
only to the harmonization of process-related environmental regulations. In the 
case of industrial-relations and social-welfare regulations, by contrast, even 
harmonization at two levels would run into enormous difficulties because of 
the much greater salience of qualitative and institutional differences. Thus, 
while it may be assumed that all countries would prefer a less polluted envi­
ronment if they could afford it, that assumption of common aspirations cannot 
be made in the industrial-relations and welfare fields (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Sweden and Switzerland, for example, are economically among the most 




























































































share of gdp which they devote to publicly provided welfare transfers and 
services. And while Germany and Britain have similar levels of union density, 
they have different structures of union organization and radically different 
collective bargaining systems. Even more important is the fact that German 
industrial relations are embedded in highly developed, and judicially enforced, 
systems of labor law, collective-bargaining law and co-determination law, 
while British labor relations have, from the beginning of this century, devel­
oped under the maxim of “free collective bargaining” and on the understand­
ing that the law of the state should not interfere with the interactions between 
capital and labor. Thus, it may be true that, quite apart from any cost consid­
erations or possible side payments, any kind of legal regulation of industrial 
relations at the European level would be unacceptable not only to employers 
but also to unions in Britain. By contrast, unions in Germany, or in Austria 
and France for that matter, have come to rely precisely on the legal effective­
ness and judicial enforceability of state regulations (Crouch 1993). And. of 
course, these institutional differences are defended by politically powerful 
organized interests which no government could lightly disregard.
In the fields of social welfare and industrial relations, therefore, the constel­
lation of interests even among countries at high levels of economic develop­
ment cannot be interpreted as the relatively benign Battle-of-the-Sexes game 
which we postulated in the field of environmental regulations. Instead, if we 
assume that the high-regulation group of countries includes two qualitatively 
different types of institutional arrangements, we would have a game constella­
tion in which both sides might prefer non-agreement over agreeing to a har­















Figure 5: Harmonization of Welfare and Industrial-Relations Regulations among Countries of a 
Similar Level of Economic Development, but with Different Types of Institutions. NA = Non- 
Agreement.
Potentially quite similar constellations of interest are likely to exist in all 




























































































cal salience - either because powerful interest groups will defend the institu­
tional status quo, or because the tradidonal institutional structure has become 
an element of social and political identities. This is most obviously true of 
political and administrative institutions themselves, but it is also true of the 
institutional structures in a great many other sectors which, in all countries, 
have been protected, in one form or another, against the operation of market 
forces by the territorial state. Traditionally, at least in Western Europe, these 
“sectors close to the state” (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995) would have included edu­
cation and basic research, health care, radio and television, telecommunica­
tions, transportation, energy and water supply, waste disposal, financial ser­
vices, agriculture, and several others.
This is a heterogeneous set, in which the justifications for state involvement 
vary as widely as the modalities - from the direct provision of services and 
infrastructure facilities by tax-financed state agencies through customer- 
financed public or highly regulated private monopolies, and state-supported 
forms of professional self-regulation, all the way to the state-subsidized pri­
vate provision of marketable goods and services. What is common to all of 
them is some form of insulation against unlimited market competition. And 
what matters here is that the attenuation of market pressures combined with 
the variety of possible forms of state intervention have generally facilitated the 
evolution of remarkably different institutional arrangements governing the 
provision of identical goods and services in the member states of the European 
Union (see, e.g. Alber/Bemardi-Schenkluhn 1992).
From the point of view of the European Community, practically all these 
institutional arrangements could be considered as non-wage barriers and, cer­
tainly, as distortions of competition. So the logic of negative integration im­
plies that they should be removed - as is currently happening in telecommuni­
cations, in air transportation and in financial services. On the other hand, not 
all of these restrictive and protective institutional arrangements may be with­
out valid justification, so that - under the logic of Arts. 36 and 100A, or of 
Art. 76 for that matter, the European harmonization of these sectoral regimes 
might seem a more appropriate response.
But, then, how could the Council reach agreement on a common European 
system of financing and delivering health care that would replace the British, 
Italian and Swedish varieties of national health service systems as well as the 
French, German and Austrian varieties of systems combining compulsory 
health insurance and private health care provision with corporatist negotiations 
between insurance systems and organized providers? Here the obstacles to 
harmonization would be at least as great as they are in the field of old-age 
pensions, where the move from the German pay-as-you-go insurance system to 
a (perhaps more desirable) common system based on the British two-tier 
model combining tax-financed basic pensions and (voluntary or compulsory) 




























































































generation would be required to pay twice - once for the present generation of 
pensioners under the old system, and once for their own life insurance under 
the new system.
A particularly instructive example is provided by the comparison of the 
telecommunications and energy sectors which appear rather similar in most 
economic respects (Schmidt 1995). In both sectors, monopolistic structures 
had prevailed unchallenged until the mid 1980s, and in both the Commission 
has been working toward liberalization since then. But while in telecommuni­
cations the combination of European liberalization, national deregulation and 
privatization, and cautious re-regulation at the European level, did succeed 
with remarkable speed (Sauter 1995), the Commission’s repeated attempts to 
liberalize the European electricity market have so far failed in the Council. As 
Susanne Schmidt has shown in her comparative study, one of the two impor­
tant factors explaining the different trajectories of liberalization is institutional 
differences (Schmidt 1995)27. Whereas in telecommunications, institutional 
structures in all West European countries had, by the 1970s, converged on a 
single model of public PTT monopolies which were the owners of the physical 
networks as well as the suppliers of all services and terminal equipment 
(Schneider 1995), the electricity sector is characterized by considerable insti­
tutional heterogeneity. While there are network monopolies everywhere, these 
may be nationwide, regional or local; they may be owned by the state, or by 
private investors; they may be restricted to the generation and distribution of 
electricity, or they may also distribute gas and other forms of energy. More­
over, there are also considerable differences in the regulatory regimes under 
which these monopolies operate, and in the basic logic of their pricing struc­
tures; and there are, of course, also fundamental differences in the way in 
which the conflict over nuclear energy is handled in each of the member 
states. As a consequence, liberalization would affect suppliers in different 
countries in rather different ways, while the call for “harmonization before 
liberalization” would confront national governments with the even more un­
palatable task of challenging vested institutional interests head on.
The short of it is that there are in fact important sectors for which the Euro­
pean-wide harmonization of national regulatory and institutional systems may 
not be a feasible option. The question there is whether negative integration 
should nevertheless be allowed to run its course in all sectors in which existing 
institutional structures can be interpreted as restraints on trade or distortions
27 The other factor Schmidt (1995, 18) identifies are differences in the vulnerability to 
international competition. In telecommunications, if there were no coordinated 
liberalization at the European level, the “default condition” which countries would have to 
face would be a choice between either national liberalization or a loss of business to more 
efficient foreign competitors who, as a consequence of technological changes, could 
invade national markets. In electricity, by contrast, the economic viability of national 





























































































of competition? If so, existing balances of values and interests incorporated in 
specific national institutions will be upset. In some sectors, these costs have 
been considered politically acceptable - but there is no reason to assume that 
this will be the case everywhere28. Where it is not, negative integration will 
either be forcefully resisted or its consequence may well be social disintegra­
tion and political delegitimation of the kind that was caused in East Germany 
by the destruction of indigenous institutions.
V. Solutions II: Restoring National Boundary Control?
It seems useful, therefore, to also think about ways in which limits can be set 
to the unreflected and quasi-automatic advance of negative integration, moti­
vated purely by considerations of economic efficiency, in the European Com­
munity. That is, of course, not much of a problem in areas where liberaliza­
tion must in fact be achieved through decisions of the Council of Ministers. 
Governments that are seriously concerned about maintaining existing institu­
tional structures are still quite capable of blocking Commission initiatives - as 
was just demonstrated again in the failure of attempts to liberalize the Euro­
pean markets for electricity. Governments have no formal power, however, to 
prevent the Commission from proceeding against nationally privileged 
“undertakings” by way of directives under Art. 90 (3) of the Treaty29, and 
they have even less control over the Commission’s use of its power to issue 
“decisions” against individual governments under the same acrticle, or to ini­
tiate infringement procedures before the Court under Art. 16930. Moreover, 
given the direct effect of primary European law, any individual or corpora­
tion could challenge existing national institutional arrangements before a na­
tional court, which could then obtain a preliminary ruling from the European 
Court of Justice under Art. 177.
Thus, political controls will not generally work - or more precisely, they 
work in a highly asymmetrical fashion. As long as the Council must proceed 
through qualified-majority or even unanimous decisions, a small minority will
28 In Germany, for instance, this might mean that compulsory user charges supporting 
public television will be successfully attacked as a subsidy distorting competition by 
private networks, and that the monopoly of private physicians in ambulatory health care 
could be invaded by American-style health maintenance organizations. While both 
changes might be considered highly desirable in some quarters, it is also clear that they 
would not find the support of democratic majorities at the national level.
29 On the other hand, governments which, for domestic reasons, might not wish to agree to 
a Council directive may actually prefer deregulation by way of Commission directives 
and decisions.
30 In the electricity field, the Commission has just initiated such actions against France, 
Denmark, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Also, the drive towards 
liberalization in telecommunications was initiated by a successful infringement action 




























































































be able to block positive action, but very large majorities would have to be 
mobilized to correct any extension of negative integration through decisions of 
the Commission3! or Gf the Court of Justice32. The question then is whether it 
may be possible to use legal instruments to limit the capacity of the Commis­
sion and the Court to extend negative integration beyond the limits of what the 
Council would also find politically acceptable.
In Maastricht, it is true, governments took care to exclude the Court from 
the areas of “a common foreign policy and security policy” and of 
“cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs” (Article L). This is, 
surely, an indication that the Court’s power to convert Treaty obligations into 
supranational law, and to interpret their meaning beyond the original intent of 
the contracting parties, has finally become a matter of concern to member 
states. It is also possible that similar concerns about the Court’s role may have 
contributed to the inclusion of a “subsidiarity clause” in Art. 3B (2) of the EC- 
Treaty. If they did, however, that purpose is unlikely to be achieved through 
the clause itself (as distinguished from the change in the political climate which 
it symbolizes).
By restricting subsidiarity to “areas which do not fall within [the Communi­
ty’s] exclusive competence”, negative integration - which, if it is to be prac­
ticed at all, must of course be an exclusive European competence - is left un­
touched - and as I have argued, it is negative integration where Commission 
and Court are able to exercise their greatest, and for national autonomy most 
damaging, power. Moreover, even with regard to positive integration the sub­
sidiarity clause is unlikely to have much legal effect (Dehousse 1993). Given 
the heterogeneitity of conditions and capacities among the member states, it is 
hardly conceivable that a court could strike down any European measure, that 
was in fact supported by a qualified in the Council of Ministers, by denying 
that “the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States”. Thus, it is probably more realistic to see the clause pri­
marily as a political appeal for self-restraint directed at the Council of Minis­
ters itself33.
3 * For instance, when the Commission issued its terminal equipment directive under Art 90 
(3), France was joined by Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece in initiating an 
(unsuccessful) Art. 173 action against key provisions of the directive. If the directive had 
not been issued by the Commission, but had been introduced in the Council under Art. 
100A, the objecting group would of course have been strong enough to prevent its 
adoption (Sauter 1995, 101).
32 In fact, as Susanne Schmidt (1995, 25f.) argues, the mere possibility of “uncontrolled” 
liberalization by the Court may persuade opponent governments agree to “coordinated 
liberalization” through (less far reaching) Council directives - in the hope that these will 
be taken into account in the Court’s own interpretation of the text of the Treaty.
33 This would not be meaningless, since member state bureaucracies may in fact use 
European directives to circumvent parliamentary controls at home. The same tendency of 
constituent governments to promote “overintegration” at the central level can also be 




























































































What might make a legal difference, for negative as well as for positive 
integration, is indicated by the very decision which advanced negative integra­
tion by a giant step. In Cassis de Dijon (120/78 ECR, 1979, 649), the Court 
did not hold, as is sometimes assumed, that the “mutual recognition” of prod­
ucts licensed by other members states was an unconditional obligation of 
member states. Before Germany was ordered to admit the French liqueur, the 
Court had examined the claim that the German requirement of a higher alco­
hol content was justified as a health regulation, and found it totally spurious 
(Alter/Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994: 538-39). If that had not been so, the import 
restriction would have been upheld under Art. 36 of the Treaty which permits 
quantitative restrictions “justified on grounds of public morality, public pol­
icy, public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants...”, provided that such measures “do not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”
Thus, the Treaty itself recognizes certain national policy goals that are able 
to override the dictates of market integration. Admittedly, the Commission, 
and the European Court of Justice even more so, have done their best to assure 
the priority of negative integration by applying extremely tough tests before 
finding that a national regulation is neither discriminatory nor a disguised re­
striction on trade. In fact, the Commission has followed a consistent line, ac­
cording to which product-related national regulations either will be struck 
down, under Cassis, because they serve no valid purpose, or must be replaced 
by harmonized European regulations under Art. 100A (Alter/Meunier-Aitsa­
halia 1994). What matters here, however, is the reverse implication: National 
regulations restricting imports, that serve one of the valid purposes listed in 
Art. 36, must be allowed to stand unless, and until, European harmonization is 
achieved.
For product-related regulations, therefore, negative integration does not take 
precedence over positive integration, and the competency gap mentioned in the 
introduction is in fact avoided. However, that is not true of process-related 
regulations which, since they do not affect the quality or safety of the products 
themselves, would never justify exclusion under Art. 36. Moreover, such 
regulations must also not violate the rules of European competition law (Arts. 
85ff), they must not insulate public service agencies against competition (Art. 
90), and they must not amount to competition-distorting state aid (Art. 92).
What is important here is that these prohibitions apply regardless of whether 
prior policy harmonization at the European level has been achieved or not. 
One example is provided by European transport policy which, along with 
agriculture, was one of the two fields in which the original Treaty had envis­
aged a fully Europeanized policy regime (Arts. 74 ff). Since, in the face of 
massive conflicts of interest among the member states, the Council had failed 
to act for more than 25 years, it was ordered by the Court (in a proceeding 




























































































conditions of negative integration according to Art. 75 (1) lit. (a) and (b). 
Moreover, the Commission and the Court have intervened against national 
regulations (such as the German levy on road haulage) that could be inter­
preted as a discrimination of non-national carriers (Art. 76). Against the 
original intent of the contracting parties, therefore, the European transport 
market is now being actively liberalized even though agreement on a common 
European regulatory regime is still not in sight.
If this state of affairs is considered unsatisfactory, one may need to go fur­
ther in the direction indicated by provisions like those contained in Arts. 36, 
48 (3), 56 (1), 66 and 100A (4) which allow restraints on the free movement 
of goods, persons and servives if these restraints serve one of the “police- 
power” purposes of public morality, public policy, public security, public 
health, etc. In practice, however, none of these exceptions is still of great im­
portance, since the Commission, and even more so the Court, have interpreted 
them in extremely restrictive fashion - and the same has been true of other 
provisions, serving similar purposes, such as the partial exemption of infras­
tructural or revenue producing national undertakings from the competition 
rules in Art. 90 (2) or the reservation regarding national systems of property 
ownership in Art. 222. In all these instances, the de-facto priority of negative 
integration over national policy preferences and institutional traditions has 
been re-established through judicial interpretation.
It remains to be seen whether the same fate is also waiting for some of the 
even more explicit reservation clauses introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, as 
for instance in Art. 126 (1) which permits the Community only a very limited 
entry into the education field, “while fully respecting the resposibility of the 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education 
systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.” By its language at least, the 
clause will only set limits to the narrowly circumscribed educational compe­
tencies of the Community, but would not otherwise offer immunity against 
charges that national education systems might represent restraints on trade and 
distortions of competition in the market for educational services.
If national policy preferences and institutional traditions should have a 
chance to survive, it seems that more powerful legal constraints are needed to 
stop the imperialism of negative integration. A radical solution would be to 
abolish the constitutional status of European competition law by taking it out 
of the Treaty altogether, leaving the determination of its scope to the political 
processes of “secondary” legislation by Council and Parliament. This would, at 
the European level, create a constitutional balance among competing policy 
purposes as it exists in all national policy systems. In addition, it might be 
explicitly stated that national legislation will remain in force unless, and until, 
it is shown to be in concrete conflict with a specific provision of European 
legislation. This is the law as it has stood in the United States since the demise 




























































































Rehbinder/Stewart 1984), and this is the de-facto state of European law with 
regard to product-related regulations in the market for goods. It could and 
should be extended to the markets for services, and in particular to trans­
portation and financial services.
These would be changes which, unlike the subsidiarity clause, would really 
make a difference, and the Intergovernmental Conference in preparation for 
“Maastricht II” would have an opportunity to promote them. In addition, it 
might be worthwhile to specifically enumerate, in the Treaty itself, policy 
areas for which member states will retain primary responsibility. The most 
plausible candidates would be the areas discussed above - namely, education, 
culture, the media, social welfare, health care, and industrial relations - and, 
of course, political and administrative organization.
As I have argued elsewhere, this would give the constitution of the Com­
munity a bi-polar character, similar to the “Dual Federalism” which the 
American Supreme Court had read into the U.S. Constitution before 1937, or 
to the case law of the German constitutional court protecting the 
“Kulturhoheit" of the Laender in the fields of education and the media 
(Scharpf 1991b; 1994; Weidenfeld 1995). There is, of course, no hope that a 
clear demarkation line between European and national areas of policy respon­
sibility could be defined. But the explicit dualism would force the Court and 
the Commission to balance the claims for the economic perfection of market 
integration against equally legitimate claims for the maintenance of national 
institutional autonomy and problem-solving capacity in the light of the con­
crete circumstances of the specific case. Instead of deciding against national 
regulations whenever the slightest distortion of competition can be identified, 
the Court would then have to weigh the degree of restriction of competition or 
mobility on the one hand against the importance of the measure for the real­
ization of legitimate member-state goals on the other. What is required, in 
other words, is the “management of interdependence” (Dehousse 1993; Joerges 
1994a) in ways which should deal, in the “vertical” relationship between 
national and European competencies, with exactly the same tensions between 
economic and non-economic purposes which, in the nation-state, are accom­
modated in the “horizontal” dimension, through interdepartmental conflicts 
that must be settled in the Cabinet or in Parliament.
But what difference would it make if such constitutional changes could be 
adopted, and if adopted, if they would have the desired impact on the judicial 
interpretation of negative integration? The European Community, after all, 
must remain committed to the creation of a common market, and so it also 
must retain legal instruments to defend the free access to national markets 
against the economic protectionism of its member states. Thus, prohibitions 
against quantitative restrictions on trade and against the discrimination of for­
eign suppliers would certainly need to remain in place. What could change is 




























































































were, “lexicographic” precedence over all competing considerations. Even 
more important: constitutional changes of the type discussed here would pro­
tect, or reestablish, the power of national governments to take certain sectors 
out of the market altogether, or to organize them in ways that restrict the 
operation of market forces. If that should imply a loss of economic efficiency, 
it should not be the business of the Community to prevent member states from 
paying this price.
VI. Social Regulation in One Country?
But even if the legal straightjacket of negative integration should be loos­
ened, and if some sectors should be allowed to remain under the more intense 
control of the territorial state, that would not generally reverse the fundamen­
tal changes in the political economy of capitalist welfare states that have 
occurred since the end of the postwar period. The larger part of the national 
economy is exposed to transnational competition, capital has become globally 
mobile, and enterprises are able to relocate production throughout Western 
Europe without risking their access to national markets. And as the mobility of 
economic factors has increased, the national capacity to reduce the rate of 
return on capital investments below the international level, either by lowering 
interest rates or by imposing additional costs on firms, has been irrevocably 
lost (Sinn 1993). In that sense, there is certainly no path that would lead back 
to the postwar “golden age” of capitalist welfare states.
From the point of view of political democracy, it would be dangerous to 
deny the existence of these economic constraints; but it would be equally dan­
gerous to exaggerate their significance. It is true that the capacity for Keyne­
sian macro-economic management is no longer available at the national level, 
and not yet available supranationally. It is also true that the rate of return 
from productive investment, which capital owners can claim, has increased 
considerably. Any attempt, by governments or unions, to reverse these losses 
by redistributive programs pursued in a national context would be bound to 
fail.
Beyond that, however, the basic character of the relationship between capi­
talist economies and democratic states is still the same. As I pointed out above, 
even in the postwar period, social regulation of the capitalist economy was 
successful only because costs of regulation that were, in the first round, im­
posed on firms could, in the second round, be passed on to consumers. As a 
consequence, returns on investment remained positive, and capitalism 
remained equally viable in the Swedish welfare state, in the German social 
market economy or in the American free enterprise system. In other words, 




























































































because ultimately the costs of the welfare state were borne by workers and 
consumers, rather than by capital owners.
If this “impossibility theorem of redistribution” is accepted, the loss of 
national regulatory capacity reduces itself to the relatively technical question 
of where the costs of (new)34 regulation should be placed in the first round. If 
they are placed on firms that are exposed to international competition, and if 
all other conditions remain the same, there will now be a loss of international 
competitiveness, and a concomitant fall in profits, investment, and employ­
ment. But, of course, other conditions need not remain the same. The rise in 
the costs of regulation could be compensated through wage concessions, 
through a rise in productivity or, as long as the European Monetary Union 
does not yet exist, through devaluation. In effect, these compensatory measures 
would, again, shift the costs on workers and domestic consumers.
However, the same result could be achieved more directly and with much 
greater certainty, if even in the first round, costs were not imposed on firms at 
all. If new social regulations, such as the German disability-care insurance, 
were financed through taxes on incomes and consumption, rather than through 
payroll taxes, enterprises would stay competitive and investments profitable. 
One example is provided by Denmark, where 85% of social costs are financed 
from general tax revenues. Since the international competitiveness of Danish 
enterprises is not affected, the (very costly) welfare state apparently does not 
play any role in current discussions about the international competitiveness of 
the Danish economy (Munster 1993)35. Of course, consumable incomes will be 
reduced, but this is as it would, and should, be in any case.
I do not wish to claim, however, that all objectives of social regulation in the 
postwar decades could also be obtained in the future without endangering in­
ternational competitiveness. Even less would I suggest that the growing tax 
resistance of voters would be easy to overcome36. Compared to the postwar 
decades, the range of choices available to democratic political processes at the 
national level has certainly become more narrow. But it is not as narrow as the 
economic determinism of many contributions to the current debate would 
seem to suggest. Moreover, it can be widened to the extent that countries and 
regions succeed in developing the comparative advantages of their given insti­
tutional and industrial structures in order to exploit their own niches in in­
34 Presumably, if an economy has been viable so far, its regulatory costs are reflected in 
current prices and exchange rates.
33 The major threat to viability of the Danish model, incidentally, comes from European 
plans to harmonize VAT rates.
36 Here, in my view, is the real reason for the current crisis of European welfare states. 
Given lower rates of economic growth, rising costs of environmental protection, 
continued mass unemployment, and a growing retirement population, the willingness of 
blue and white collar voters to bear an ever rising tax burden has become the critical 




























































































creasingly specialized world markets. The precondition, of course, is a high 
degree of policy flexibility, and a capacity to respond to specific locational 
conditions and changing market opportunities, at all levels of policy making, 
European, national, and subnational - as well as in management and industrial 
relations.
Thus, the European economy may indeed need the larger market, and hence 
common rules, in order to be able to keep up with American and Japanese 
competitors in branches of production in which economies of scale make a 
significant difference. But Europe will certainly fall behind if negative inte­
gration paralyzes national and subnational problem solving, while on the 
European level only unsatisfactory compromises can be reached after long and 
difficult negotiations.
To succeed in the global economy, Europe depends on more effective Euro­
pean policy making with better democratic legitimation. But it depends equally 
on the autonomous problem-solving capacities of national and subnational 
polities. While the debate about subsidiarity may help to limit the perfection­
ism and the rigidities of positive integration, we also need a debate about the 
need to limit the perfectionism of negative integration. Only if we succeed in 
both will we be able to combine the economic efficiency of the larger market 
with the problem solving capacities of political action on the European level 
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